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FUNCTIONALISM AND THE INFIELD FLY RULE 
Mark A. Graber* 
Howard Wasserman’s Infield Fly Rule Is in Effect: The History and 
Strategy of Baseball’s Most (In)Famous Rule1 provides a wonderful 
functionalist explanation and justification of the Infield Fly Rule that is 
subject to the conventional critiques of functional explanations and 
justifications. Functional explanations and justifications claim that “law 
always is, or at least ought to be, functionally adapting to evolving social 
needs.”2 Wasserman claims that the Infield Fly Rule  was adopted because 
and is justified by the need to prevent fielders from gaining unfair advantages 
by refraining from exercising the ordinary skills necessary to catch a pop fly.3 
The conventional critique of functional models is they confuse needs with 
interests and ignore the contingent politics and policy choices that explain 
why law took one path rather than another.4 Reconceptualizing the Infield 
Fly Rule as preventing infielders from exercising certain skills and 
encouraging batters to swing for the fences provides reasons for thinking that 
edict may reflect the interests of less skilled fielders during the nineteenth 
century and long-ball hitters during the twentieth and twenty-first century.  
That reconceptualize also suggests the Infield Fly Rule may be partly a 
consequence of  the politics of teams with less skilled fielders and long-ball 
hitters, rather than simply being a neutral principle of baseball law and lore. 
Wasserman provides a classical functionalist explanation and 
justification of the Infield Fly Rule. He maintains that the rule “continues to 
make sense as a way of avoiding uniquely inequitable cost-benefit disparities 
and perverse incentives within the game.”5 Neither interests nor politics play 
an explanatory or justificatory role. By dropping an infield fly that any major 
league baseball player (or high school athlete) could easily catch with 
ordinary skill, the defensive team puts themselves in the position of being 
able to obtain two outs rather than one, an outcome the offensive team is 
powerless to prevent. The practice of not catching a simple infield pop-up 
 
*Regents Professor, University of Maryland Carey School of Law. Thanks to Maxwell Stearns and 
Richard Boldt for not talking me out of this. 
1 HOWARD M. WASSERMAN, INFIELD FLY RULE IS IN EFFECT: THE HISTORY AND STRATEGY OF 
BASEBALL’S MOST (IN)FAMOUS RULE (2018). 
2 Robert W. Gordon, Critical Legal Histories, 36 STAN. L. REV. 57, 68 (1984). 
3 WASSERMAN, supra note 1, at 15–20. 
4 Gordon, supra note 2, at 71–74. 
5 WASSERMAN, supra note 1, at 185. 
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violates four objective conditions of a good game, the violation of all four of 
which justifies banning the practice. 
1. “Intentional failure to perform expected athletic skills in 
the expected manner;”6 
2. “One-inequitable-benefit cost disparity;”7 
3. “One-sided disparity in control or influence on the play;”8 
4. “Perverse incentives.”9 
Functionalists explanations and justifications are vulnerable because 
their underlying conditions are usually more subjective than objective. 
Irrational behavior from one perspective can be reconceptualized as rational 
behavior from another. Social needs can be reconceptualized as interests. 
Consider claims that free markets obviate the need for anti-discrimination 
laws because racial discrimination is inefficient.10 If, however, we 
reconceptualize the goals of business enterprises and customers as 
maximizing the benefits of being members of a superior race rather than 
needs to make a profit,11 the laws banning race discrimination are necessary 
market correctives. 
Reconceptualizing the skills needed for catching and dropping infield 
fly balls suggests politics rather functional adaptation better explains the rule. 
Fielders who convert an intentionally dropped pop-up into a double play are 
demonstrating greater athletic skills than those who catch the ball. The former 
is not merely “intentional[ly] fail[ing] to perform expected athletic skills in 
the expected manner.”12 Most amateurs can catch an infield fly. Many, I 
suspect, cannot easily convert an intentionally dropped pop-up into a double 
play. Thus, the crucial issue underlying the Infield Fly Rule is when athletes 
should be allowed to refrain from exhibiting an ordinary skill in order to 
perform a somewhat more difficult task. The analogy is with the basketball 
player who disdains an uncontested two-point layup for a more difficult 
uncontested three-point shot rather than with the football quarterback who 
takes a knee at the end of the game to run out the clock rather than risk a 
fumble by attempting the more difficult task of gaining yards. This 
reconceptualizing of Wasserman’s first condition may have been particularly 
pertinent to the turn of the twentieth century when both fielders and fields 
 
6 Id. at 57. 
7 Id. at 59. 
8 Id. at 60. 
9 Id. at 64. 
10 See generally RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINST EMPLOYMENT 
DISCRIMINATION LAWS (1992). 
11 See generally Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1707, 1709 (1993). 
12 WASSERMAN, supra note 1, at 54. 
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were worse. Given the probability of significant variation in team capacity to 
convert easily an infield pop-up into a double play, the possibility exists that 
underneath the mask of “poor sportsmanship” or “undue gaming” was an 
effort by the less gifted or the owners of less gifted to prevent better fielders 
from gaining another competitive advantage. 
Reconceptualizing when a play begins suggests the Infield Fly Rule may 
privilege some interests rather than others. The Infield Fly Rule prevents 
“one-sided disparity in control or influence on the play” only if, as 
Wasserman insists, the play begins when the batter hits the infield fly.13 The 
imbalance of power vanishes if the play begins with the pitch, with the batter 
or with the line-up card. A skillful batter can reduce the probability of an 
infield fly by stopping the swing at the last minute. Batters by attempting to 
bunt or cutting down on their swings similarly reduce the probability that 
they will hit a pop-up to the infield. Managers can reduce the probability of 
an infield fly by substituting a line-drive hitter for a slugger either in an 
infield-fly situation or at the beginning of the game. Of course, the same 
strategies that reduce the risk of an infield fly reduce the possibility of a 
sacrifice fly, a booming double or, if the bases are loaded, a grand slam. The 
point is that treating the batting team as a bystander fails to grasp the entirely 
strategic context. Fielding teams are often in the position of deciding whether 
to drop an infield fly intentionally because the batting team and batter 
adopted strategies likely to increase the probability of an infield fly. The 
Infield Fly Rule from this perspective reduces the cost of batting the long-
ball hitter who is prone to pop-ups (and strike outs) while weakening the 
position of contact hitters who have a greater tendency to hit line drives and 
groundballs. 
My concern that this functionalist account of the Infield Fly Rule does 
not hold up reflects more on functionalist accounts rather than on 
Wasserman. Wasserman has done a magnificent job chronicling the history 
of the Infield Fly Rule, the justifications of that Infield Fly Rule the influence 
of the Infield Fly Rule and the structure of professional sports rules more 
generally. There is both insight and elbow grease in every chapter. He has 
demonstrated the best functional explanation and justification of the Infield 
Fly Rule. The criticisms below should be read to highlight longstanding 
problems with even the best functionalist explanations and justifications and 
do not demonstrate any distinctive flaw in Wasserman’s functionalist 
account. 
 
13 WASSERMAN, supra note 1, at 63. 
